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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Greentree
v. Fertitta:
THREE-YEAR
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
APPLICABLE
WHEN TORT
CLAIM AGAINST
DECEDENT'S
ESTATE IS COVERED
BY LIABILITY
INSURANCE.

In Greentree v. Fertitta,
338 Md. 621, 659 A.2d 1325
(1995), the Court ofAppeals of
Maryland held that the general
three-year statute oflimitations
applies to a tort claim against a
decedent's estate when covered
by a liability insurance policy,
despite the special time limitations on the administration of
estates. In so holding, section
8-104(e) of the Estates and
Trusts Article ofthe Annotated
Code of Maryland was construed as creating an exception
to the case law developed based
upon common law principles.
Thus, the court distinguished
between cases where the claimant sought recovery from the
estate ofthe decedent and those
involving recovery from an insurance company who assumed
the risk of insuring the decedent.
On June 29, 1989, Susan Greentree ("Greentree") was
involved in an automobile accident with Neal Fertitta
("Fertitta"). Unable to settle
with Fertitta's insurance company after almost three years of
negotiations, Greentree filed
suit in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County naming Fertitta
as the sole defendant. Subsequently, Greentree learned that
Fertitta had died over a year
before the suit was filed. Thus,
Greentree's attorney opened an
estate for Fertitta and served
her complaint upon the estate's
personal representative.
In the circuit court, the
estate filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the claim was timebarred by section 8-104 of the

Estates and Trusts Article.
Greentree then amended her
complaint, naming Fertitta's
estate as defendant. The circuit
court granted the estate's motion to dismiss, ruling that
Greentree's amendment was not
timely filed under section 8103. Section 8-103(a)(I) provides a six-month statute oflimitations for filing claims against
an estate following the death of
a decedent prior to October 1,
1992. Upon appeal, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court's
application ofthe statute oflimitations was erroneous. However, the court of special appeals affirmed the circuit court's
decision, holding that the
amendment substituting the estate as defendant did not relate
back to the filing of the original
complaint. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted
Greentree's petition for certiorari.
To the extent a successful claim would be satisfied by
the proceeds of an insurance
policy rather than by the assets
of an estate, the Court of Appeals ofMaryland held that section 8-1 04(e) made certain procedural requirements inapplicable which would otherwise
limit claims against estates.
Greentree, 338 Md. at 627,659
A.2d at 1328. The court noted
that the short statute of limitations in suits against an estate
was designed to promote speed
and efficiency in estate administration, while claims against
an estate that are covered by
insurance are limited to recov-
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ery from the insurance company. Id. at 629, 659 A.2d at
1329. Therefore, claims against
an insurance carrier filed subsequent to the six-month period
after the insured's death would
not hinder a personal representative's statutory obligation to
settle an estate expeditiously.
Id.
Reasoning that section
8-1 04(e) was intended to relax
the procedural rules that favor
prompt resolution in the distribution of estates with regard to
claims covered by insurance,
the court of appeals determined
that section 8-1 04( e) provided
that the three-year statute of
limitations
applied
to
Greentree's claim. Id. at 630,
659 A.2d at 1329. Furthermore, the court noted that section 8-104(e)(2) limits a claimant's recovery under the section to the amount of the decedent's liability insurance coverage, regardless of the amount
ofjudgment entered against the
estate. Id. at 628, 659 A.2d at
1329. In addition, the court
opined that in the present case,
section 8-1 04(e), made inapplicable the rule of Burket v.
Aldridge, 241 Md. 423, 216
A.2d 910 (1966), which governs the limitations of claims
against estates. Id. at 630, 659
A.2d at 1330. TheBurketprinciple prevents a late claim
against an estate from relating
back to a complaint filed against
the decedent after the time of
death, but within the period of
limitations. Greentree, 338 Md.
at 630,659 A.2d at 1330 (citing
Burket v. Aldridge, 241 Md.
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423,216 A.2d 910 (1966)).
The court then noted
that applying the three-year statute oflimitations to claims covered by insurance where the insured died before the suit is
filed fulfilled the contract of
insurance between the insurer
and the insured. Id. at 630,659
A.2d at 1330. The court also
stressed that permitting an insurance company to avoid liability under the policy because
of the unforeseen death of its
insured allowed the insurer to
take advantage of procedural
rules governing the administration of estates and would be
contrary to Maryland's strong
public policy of compensating
those injured in motor vehicle
accidents. Id. at 631,659 A.2d
at 1330.
Finally, the court of
appeals observed that the notice requirement of claims covered by insurance generally differs from claims against the assets of an estate. Id. While the
personal representative of an
estate may be unaware of circumstances giving rise to claims
against an estate, an insurer typically has notice of a claim long
before a suit is filed. Id. The
court noted that the purpose of
a statute oflimitations has been
"'to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber . . . .'" Id.
(quoting Order ojRailroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 34849 (1944)). Section 8-104(e)
recognizes that notice requirements with respect to uninsured

claims against decedents' estates are not applicable where
the claim is covered by insurance. Id. at 632, 659 A.2d at
13 3O. Having filed suit within
the applicable three-year statute oflimitations, the court held
that Greentree's action was
timely, regardless of special
time limitations imposed by the
Estates and Trusts Article and
the Burket principle. Id.
A dissent by Judge
Karwacki, in which Judge
Rodowsky joined, characterized the majority's decision as
judicially amending those sections of the Estates and Trusts
Article which govern the time
limitations for presenting various claims against the estate of
a decedent. Id.at632,659A.2d
at 1330-31 (Karwacki, J., dissenting). In reviewing the
Burket holding, JudgeKarwacki
reasoned that under almost identical facts, the court of appeals
held that a suit against a dead
man was a nullity, and, therefore, there was nothing to which
the amendment substituting the
estate could relate back. Id. at
635, 659 A.2d at 1332. The
dissent also questioned the appropriateness of the majority's
exception to the statute oflimitations which would have the
effect of creating such an exception ifa decedent was aware,
at any time during the limitations period while alive, of a
potential claim against him. Id.
at 636, 659 A.2d at 1332-33.
Furthermore, Judge Karwacki
reasoned that Greentree's suit
was procedurally barred by section 8-101(a) which provides

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
that unless, and until, a personal representative is qualified,
there is no party in existence
capable of being sued. Id. at
637,659 A.2d at 1333. Therefore, the dissent insisted, the
suit was improper since at the
time of the commencement, no
personal representative had
been appointed, and anyamendment could not relate back as
the original complaint had no
legal effect. Id. at 639, 659
A.2d at 1334.

In Greentree v. Fertitta,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland drew a distinction between
claims involving the assets of
an estate and claims involving
the proceeds of a decedent's
policy of insurance. This decision recognizes the inequitable
result which would occur if
insurance companies were allowed to benefit from premiums received from the insured
while avoiding their obligations
by omitting the fact ofthe death

of the insured prior to the commencement of a suit. While
reinforcing the public policy
concern of protecting the rights
of those injured in automobile
accidents to receive compensation, the court's decision simultaneously curtails actions by
insurers aimed at eluding liability through the use of procedural loopholes.

-Orhan K. Orner
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